RCRA Liability for Property Owners, Operators and Managers
Minimizing Risks Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and Ensuring Indemnification

A Live 90-Minute Teleconference/Webinar with Interactive Q&A

Today's panel features:
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")

- RCRA, 42 U.S.C. 6901, was enacted in 1976, amended in 1984, 1986
- "Cradle-to-grave" system for tracking and managing hazardous wastes
- RCRA regulates the generation, transportation, treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous wastes
What does RCRA Regulate?

Solid Wastes:

“[A]ny garbage, refuse, sludge . . . and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities . . . .”

RCRA § 1004(27)
What does RCRA Regulate? (cont’d)

• That are Hazardous:
  - “Listed” Hazardous Wastes
    • 40 C.F.R. § 261 subpart D
  - “Characteristic” Wastes
    • Ignitability, Corrosivity, Reactivity, Toxicity
    • 40 C.F.R. § 261 subpart C
How does RCRA Regulate?

- RCRA imposes requirements on persons associated with hazardous wastes:
  - Generators
    - RCRA § 3002
  - Transporters
    - RCRA § 3003
  - Owners and Operators of Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities
    - RCRA §§ 3004, 3005
How is RCRA Enforced?

- Environmental Protection Agency may sue to
  - Gather information
    - § 3007
  - Administrative compliance orders and judicial injunctions
    - § 3008
  - Suits to abate imminent and substantial endangerment
    - § 7003
How is RCRA Enforced? (cont’d)

- **Criminal enforcement**
  - § 3008(d) (knowing transport of haz. waste to facility without a permit and knowing treatment, storage or disposal of haz. waste w/o permit or in knowing violation of permit.)
  - § 3008(e) (knowing endangerment)

- **Citizen Suits**
  - § 7002 (42 U.S.C. § 6972)
RCRA Citizen Suits

- **RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A)**
  - Suit against a person who is “alleged to be in violation of”
  - a RCRA permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order

- **RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(B)**
  - Suit against past or present owner/operator of TSD facility, transporter or generator
  - who has “contributed” or who is “contributing to”
  - handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal
  - Waste problem at a site which may present an “imminent and substantial endangerment” to health or the environment
DEFENSES TO RCRA CITIZEN SUITS

• Failure to provide proper notice
  - 60 days for (a)(1)(A) “violation” citizen suit
  - 90 days for (a)(1)(B) “imm. and subst. endangerment” suit

• Diligent prosecution
  - “Violation” suit: civil/criminal action to require compliance
  - “Endangerment” suit: action under RCRA 7003 or CERCLA 106 (including court and administrative orders); or engaged in removal action under CERCLA 104; or engaged in RI/FS and diligently proceeding with remediation.

• Defenses to underlying substantive claims
Remedies for RCRA Citizen Suits

• Injunctive Relief Only:
  – Unlike CERCLA, RCRA § 7002(a) does not allow a party to recover cleanup costs. See Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479 (1996)

• However, the prevailing party may recover its attorney’s fees and costs under § 7003(e)
Conflicting views of operator liability under RCRA

- Current conflict regarding liability of former operators
Background Facts

- Contamination from dry cleaner located in shopping center in DeKalb County, Georgia
- Faison and Associates, LLC ("Faison") was property manager from September 1995 through September 1997
- Scarlett ordered to clean up PCE
- Sought contribution under RCRA, CERCLA and Georgia hazardous waste law
• Faison had no connection to the shopping after 1997

• Scarlett still asserted Faison was “operating” a facility, based on the continued presence of PCE
Court’s ruling on RCRA claims

- Court found that Faisons could be liable as an operator under CERCLA
- On RCRA, the court found potential liability under RCRA
  - if operator failed to remedy past contamination or comply with regulations
  - particularly true when the contamination had been shown to be migrating
• PCE plume continuously migrating and expanding since early to mid 1990s with ongoing releases

• Faison sent letter to dry cleaner on EPA’s reporting requirements and followed up

• No dispute that the PCE had not been cleaned up

• Conclusion – dispute regarding whether Faison was an operator under RCRA “notwithstanding the fact that Faison ceased its involvement at the Shopping Center on or about September 1, 1997.”
La Plata County
Background Facts

- County purchased property in 1983 and converted property into jail. County is current owner.
- County alleged spills and leaks of solvents during Brown Retail’s predecessor’s operations.
- No Federal or state cleanup orders or actions.
La Plata County
Claims asserted by plaintiff

• Plaintiff County asserted RCRA citizens suit “violation” claim and “imminent and substantial endangerment” claim; CERCLA cost recovery claims; unjust enrichment; negligence; negligence per se; and abnormally dangerous activity.
  – Court dismissed citizen suit “violation”, unjust enrichment, negligence per se, and abn. dangerous activity claims.

• Plaintiff notice letter indicated span of alleged RCRA violation from November 19, 1980 to date when County purchased property.
La Plata County
Court’s Ruling on RCRA Claim

• Court held that cause of action under (a)(1)(A) can only be brought against an owner/operator of polluting property who is “alleged to be in violation” of RCRA.
  - Because Brown Retail was not current owner/operator, and “polluting acts indisputably ceased no later than than the date in 1983 when plaintiff purchased the property”, Brown was not alleged to be in violation and Court dismissed claim.
  - Plaintiff County is the current owner operator.
La Plata County
Court’s Reasoning

• Relied upon *Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc.*, 484 U.S. 49, 58-64 (1987) - Brown is not “alleged to be in violation” because actions wholly past.
  - Plaintiff argued that wholly past acts can be “continuous violations” when pollution has not been remediated.

• Court distinguished other non-(a)(1)(A) RCRA cases.

• Disagreed with *City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials*, 833 F.Supp. 646, 656 (N.D. Ohio 1993), because court relied on case in which defendant was current owner/operator.

• Found CWA case, *Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra*, 838 F.Supp. 623 (D.R.I. 1990) persuasive - “clearly directed to a present violation by the person against who the citizen suit is brought.”
Best Practices to Minimize RCRA Liability

- Compliance audits

- Prospective acquisitions – conduct all appropriate inquiry prior to acquisition; take reasonable steps following acquisition

- Contractual solutions
  - Representations and warranties
  - Indemnity (scope, covered claims/persons, notice etc.)
  - Release/covenant not to sue
  - Insurance

- Disclosure issues
“RCRA regulates how wastes should be managed to avoid potential threats to human health and the environment. CERCLA, on the other hand, comes into play when mismanagement occurs or has occurred (i.e., when there has been a release or a substantial threat of a release in the environment of a hazardous substance or of a pollutant or contaminant that presents an imminent and substantial threat to human health).” EPA RCRA Orientation Manual.
Differences Between RCRA and CERCLA (cont.)

- Funding
- CERCLA hazardous substances versus RCRA solid/hazardous waste
- Past owner/operators
- Response cost recovery
- Injunctive relief
- Liability thresholds
- ARARs
- Off-site Disposal
- Implementation of cleanup (owner/operator v. PRPs)
This environmental contamination case is before me on Defendant, Brown Group Retail, Inc.’s (“Brown Group”), Partial Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint [Docket # 57]; Plaintiff’s Response [Docket # 67]; and Brown Group’s Reply [Docket # 70]. Oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this motion. After consideration of the motion, the papers, and the case file, and for the reasons stated below, I GRANT in part and DENY in part Brown Group’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket # 57] as follows.

I. BACKGROUND

The following relevant facts are alleged in the Second Amended Complaint [Docket # 49]. In 1983, Plaintiff—a county in Colorado—purchased a parcel of land (“the property”) previously owned by Brown Group. Beginning in 1975, Brown Group had operated a rifle scope
manufacturing facility (“the facility”) on the property. Toxic solvents used in the manufacturing process were spilled and leaked onto the floor of the facility and were flushed down the drains of the facility. The plumbing beneath the facility leaked solvents into the surrounding soil and contaminated the groundwater. The spills and leaks continued up until Plaintiff purchased the property in 1983. The property currently houses a detention center.

Plaintiff sampled the soil and groundwater at the property, as well as the surrounding area. Plaintiff’s tests showed levels of toxic solvents in the soil and groundwater that exceed government standards for the protection of human health and the environment. The toxic plume extends into otherwise-potable groundwater supplies and reaches the Animas River, which is a source of drinking water. Fumes from the solvents escape the surface of the property into the detention center. Brown Group has not taken steps to abate or contain the contamination.

Plaintiff filed the present Second Amended Complaint on December 18, 2008, alleging seven claims for relief: (1) Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) cost recovery; (2) unjust enrichment; (3) negligence and negligence per se; (4) abnormally dangerous activity (strict liability); (5) declaratory relief; (6) Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) relief for ongoing contamination; and (7) RCRA relief for prior contamination while Brown Group was the owner and/or operator of the property and the facility. Brown Group filed the present motion on January 8, 2009 [Docket # 57].

Brown Group moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6); and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1)

As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts may only adjudicate cases that the Constitution and Congress have granted them the authority to hear. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Accordingly, Rule 12(b)(1) directs a court to dismiss a complaint whenever it appears the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(h)(3). The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction is on the party asserting jurisdiction. See Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). When a party challenges the facts upon which subject matter jurisdiction depends, a district court may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint’s factual allegations, but has discretion to consider affidavits and other evidence to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts. See Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995).

B. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6)

Granting a motion to dismiss is a harsh remedy which must be exercised with caution to protect the liberal rules of pleading and the interests of justice. See Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1359 (10th Cir. 1989). Thus, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure erect a powerful presumption against rejecting pleadings for failure to state a claim. Id. Nonetheless, a claim “may be dismissed either because it asserts a legal theory not cognizable as a matter of law or because the claim fails to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim.” Golan v. Ashcroft, 310 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1217 (D. Colo. 2004).

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a district court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint. See
While the factual allegations need not be pleaded in great detail, they must be sufficiently precise to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–65, 1969 (2007) (abrogating the rule of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 44–45 (1957), that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”); Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007).

A district court should dismiss the complaint if the plaintiff fails to proffer “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974; see also Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218. “Plausible” in this context refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). “Plausibility,” however, does not refer to the likelihood that the allegations can be proven or even that the allegations are true. See id.

“The determination of whether a complaint contains enough allegations of fact to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face is dependent on the context of the claim raised.” Mink v. Knox, 566 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1221 (D. Colo. 2008); see also Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1248. The “mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original).
Accordingly, “within the context of the claim alleged, the complaint must contain enough specific allegations of fact to show that if all the alleged facts—and only the alleged facts—are believed to be true, the plaintiff has a claim for relief.” Knox, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 1222; see Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965; Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247–48.

III. ANALYSIS

Brown Group moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Claim (unjust enrichment); Third Claim (negligence and negligence per se); Fourth Claim (abnormally dangerous activity); Sixth Claim (RCRA Section 6972(a)(1)(A)); and Seventh Claim (RCRA Section 6972(a)(1)(B)).

A. Unjust Enrichment

Brown Group initially argues Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim should be dismissed because it is preempted by Plaintiff’s CERCLA claims. Section 114(b) of CERCLA provides that any person who receives compensation under CERCLA is “precluded from recovering compensation for the same removal costs or damages or claims pursuant to any other State or Federal law.” See 42. U.S.C. § 9614(b). As noted by the Tenth Circuit, however, Section 114(b) does not indicate Congress intended to preempt state-law remedies for hazardous waste contamination. See New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1244 (10th Cir. 2006). Indeed, the language of Section 114(b) itself indicates that a Plaintiff may recover identical compensation under either a state law theory or CERCLA, but not both. See Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 127 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Such a provision would be unnecessary and inexplicable if . . . costs that may be recovered under CERCLA may not be recovered under state law. In other words, if CERCLA’s remedies preempted state remedies for recovering costs of hazardous waste cleanups, § 114(b) would make no sense at all.”); see also Stanton Road Assocs.
v. Lohrey Enters., 984 F.2d 1015, 1021–22 (9th Cir. 1993).

Brown Group next argues that—even if Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim is not preempted by CERCLA as a general matter of law—it should be preempted here because the unjust enrichment claim seeks the same damages as Plaintiff’s CERCLA claim. As an initial matter, I note it does not appear that Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim seeks recovery of damages that are identical to those available under Plaintiff’s CERCLA claim. For example, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages that are unavailable to private parties under CERCLA. See Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d at 1246 n.34 (“CERCLA as enacted provides no private right of action for personal or economic injury caused by the release of hazardous substances”). Even if the recovery sought was identical, however, it is well established that a plaintiff may seek alternative theories of recovery, even when only one of those theories could actually bear fruit at trial. See Huffman v. Saul Holdings Ltd. P’ship, 194 F.3d 1072, 1081 (10th Cir. 1999); Smith v. Cashland, Inc., 193 F.3d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999); Bradbury v. Dennis, 368 F.2d 905, 908 (10th Cir. 1966); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d).

Brown Group cites a recent case from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio holding: “Where . . . a plaintiff’s CERCLA and state law claims seek recovery of the same response costs, courts have found that CERCLA preempts the plaintiff’s right to recover under the state law. As plaintiff herein is seeking the same damages under § 107 of CERCLA as it is under the state law claim, these claims are subject to dismissal” under Rule 12(b)(6). See Ashtabula River Corp. Group II v. Conrail, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 2d 981, 986 (N.D. Ohio 2008). I do not find the Ashtabula River decision—which is not controlling on this Court in any regard—persuasive. Although Ashtabula River referred to “courts” finding dismissal
appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) when a plaintiff “is seeking the same damages under . . . CERCLA as it is under the state law claim,” the court cites to only one case: *Vine Street, LLC v. Keeling*, 460 F. Supp. 2d 728, 757 (E.D. Tex. 2006). *Vine Street*, however, was of an entirely different posture: the plaintiff had already prevailed on both its state law and CERCLA claims, and the issue was whether damages recovery was allowable under both theories, or—as the court ultimately decided—whether CERCLA recovery preempted the plaintiff’s right to recover under the state law claim. *See Vine Street*, 460 F. Supp. 2d at 757.

Rather than show dismissal to be the proper remedy, *Vine Street* is consistent with the Federal Rules—and Tenth Circuit authority—allowing a plaintiff to pursue alternative and legally inconsistent theories up until the point where one of the inconsistent theories prevails to the exclusion of the others. *See Cross Country Land Servs., Inc. v. PB Telecomms.*, 276 F. App’x 825, 830–33 (10th Cir. 2008); *Huffman*, 194 F.3d at 1081; *Smith v. Cashland, Inc.*, 193 F.3d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 1999); *Kaiser v. Bowlen*, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1203 (D. Colo. 2002); *see also United States ex rel. Roby v. Boeing Co.*, 184 F.R.D. 107, 112–13 (S.D. Ohio 1998) (holding the Federal Rules allow a party to plead as many separate federal statutory and common law claims as the party has, regardless of consistency, and Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is unavailable on that basis). Accordingly—as *Ashtabula River* cites no relevant law in support and appears contrary to prevailing case law in this Circuit, as well as the Federal Rules—I decline to follow the *Ashtabula River* decision and deny Brown Group’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim.

**B. Negligence**

Brown Group argues Plaintiff’s negligence claim should be dismissed because it is
preempted by Plaintiff’s CERCLA claim. For the reasons stated above in reference to Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, Brown Group’s argument is likewise rejected here.

Brown Group also argues Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a negligence claim. As Plaintiff’s negligence claim arises under Colorado state law, I look to rulings of the Colorado Supreme Court for guidance. *Lovell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.*, 466 F.3d 893, 899 (10th Cir. 2006). If no applicable rulings exist, I must endeavor to predict how the Colorado Supreme Court would rule. *Id.* In such circumstances, I must follow any intermediate state court decision unless other authority demonstrates the Colorado Supreme Court would decide otherwise. *Daitom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp.*, 741 F.2d 1569, 1574 (10th Cir. 1984). The policies underlying the applicable legal doctrines, the doctrinal trends indicated by these policies, and the decisions of other courts may also inform my analysis. *Id.* at 1574–75.

Under Colorado law, “a claimant alleging negligence of another party must establish the existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, causation, and damages.” *Redden v. SCI Colo. Funeral Servs., Inc.*, 38 P.3d 75, 80 (Colo. 2001). Brown Group argues Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to show if all the alleged facts—and only the alleged facts—are shown to be true, Brown Group owed Plaintiff a duty of care. I disagree.

Under Colorado law, the court “determines as a question of law ‘the existence and scope of the duty—that is, whether the plaintiff’s interest that has been infringed by the conduct of the defendant is entitled to legal protection.’” *Observatory Corp. v. Daly*, 780 P.2d 462, 466 (Colo. 1989) (quoting *Metro. Gas Repair Serv., Inc. v. Kulik*, 621 P.2d 313, 317 (Colo. 1980)). So long as the plaintiff pleads sufficient facts—“including the foreseeability of harm from the failure of the defendant to take protective action, the social utility of the defendant’s conduct, the
magnitude of the burden of guarding against the harm, the practical consequences of placing such a burden on the defendant, and other relevant factors as disclosed by the particular circumstances of the case”—to establish the existence of a duty if all factual allegations in the complaint are taken as true, a duty will be considered established for purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Erickson, 127 S. Ct. at 2200; Observatory Corp., 780 P.2d at 466.

In support of its negligence claim, Plaintiff alleges: Brown Group used toxic chemicals in the facility and handled these chemicals in a manner that caused frequent leaks and spills; Brown Group allowed the chemicals to escape into the property outside the facility and the surrounding environment; Brown Group regularly disposed of the chemicals by pouring or washing them down drains; Brown Group failed to obtain government permits or approval for disposal of the chemicals; Brown Group disposed of the chemicals in a manner that caused ongoing environmental degradation; and Brown Group disposed of the chemicals in a manner that caused ongoing harm to persons using the property after the chemicals were spilled. Taking these allegations as true, Plaintiff adequately alleges a duty owed it by Brown Group sufficient to overcome a 12(b)(6) motion. See Dept. of Health v. The Mill, 887 P.2d 993, 1002 (Colo. 1994) (“Under Colorado common law, landowners have a duty to prevent activities and conditions on their land from creating an unreasonable risk of harm to others.”); Antolovich v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582, 594 (Colo. Ct. App. 2007).

C. Negligence per se

Brown Group argues Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim should be dismissed because it is preempted by Plaintiff’s CERCLA claim. For the reasons stated above in reference to Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, Brown Group’s argument is likewise rejected here.
Brown Group also argues Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support a negligence per se claim. I agree. Under Colorado law, “negligence per se occurs when the defendant violates a statute adopted for the public’s safety and the violation proximately causes the plaintiff’s injury. To recover, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that the statute was intended to protect against the type of injury she suffered and that she is a member of the group of persons the statute was intended to protect.” *Scott v. Matlack, Inc.*, 39 P.3d 1160, 1166 (Colo. 2002).

Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege the violation of any particular statute that proximately caused Plaintiff’s injuries, fails to allege an injury that was of the type the statute was enacted to protect against, and fails to allege Plaintiff is a member of the group of persons the statute was intended to protect. Instead, Plaintiff’s complaint contains a list of what appears to be many thousands of statutes and regulations Brown Group might have violated. Rather than plead the alleged violations with any degree of specificity—such that the Court would have reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for this claim, *see Ridge at Red Hawk*, 493 F.3d at 1177—Plaintiff’s allegations are so general that they “encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it [necessarily] innocent.” *See Robbins*, 519 F.3d at 1247 (quoting *Twombly*, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). This is insufficient to show, within the context of the negligence per se claim alleged, “that if all the alleged facts—and only the alleged facts—are believed to be true, the plaintiff has a claim for relief.” *Knox*, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 1222; *see Twombly*, 127 S. Ct. at 1965; *Robbins*, 519 F.3d at 1247–48. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s negligence per se claim is dismissed.

**D. Abnormally Dangerous Activity**

Brown Group argues Plaintiff’s abnormally dangerous activity claim should be dismissed
because it is preempted by Plaintiff’s CERCLA claim. For the reasons stated above in reference to Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, Brown Group’s argument is likewise rejected here. Brown Group also argues Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support an abnormally dangerous activity claim. I agree.

The Colorado Supreme Court recognizes a theory of strict liability for ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous activities. See Bayer v. Crested Butte Mountain Resort, Inc., 960 P.2d 70, 81 (Colo. 1998); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Horn Tower Const. Co., 147 Colo. 166, 170 (Colo. 1961) (“Since the emergence of negligence as an independent tort during the last century, fault has been a necessary ingredient of tort liability except in the area of ultra-hazardous activity.”). One who engages in such activity is strictly liable for any damages proximately caused to other persons, land, or chattels by that activity. See Cook v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 181 F.R.D. 473, 486 (D. Colo. 1998).

Whether an activity is ultra-hazardous—thereby subjecting the actor to strict liability—is a question of law for a court to decide. See King v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1076 (D. Colo. 1999), rev’d in part on other grounds, 301 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2002). In making such a determination, I look to the factors outlined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520. Id. Analysis of these factors requires a particularized inquiry into the activity alleged to be ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous. See Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1544 (10th Cir. 1992). This initial inquiry is a factual one that requires consideration of all the relevant circumstances. See id. As noted by the Tenth Circuit in Daigle, the requisite factors I must consider under RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 when determining whether a given activity is ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous are:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.

See Daigle, supra, 972 F.2d at 1544. The presence of any one of these factors “is not necessarily sufficient of itself in a particular case, and ordinarily several of them will be required for strict liability. On the other hand, it is not necessary that each of them be present, especially if others weigh heavily.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment f.

The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint indicate the chemicals used in the facility were mishandled, and that it was the mishandling of the chemicals that caused the property contamination. Although Plaintiff’s complaint states that each of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 factors are met, Plaintiff merely recites the factors a court should consider without alleging specific facts in support. Such “statements” are not statements of fact which must be assumed true for purposes of this motion, but are instead legal conclusions. See Smith v. Plati, 258 F.3d 1167, 1174 (10th Cir. 2001). It is well-established in this Circuit that “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim on which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see Erikson v. Pawnee County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2001). Without
specific factual allegations supporting the conclusions, Plaintiff has no claim for relief. See Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1965; Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247–48. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s abnormally dangerous activity claim is likewise dismissed.

E. RCRA Claims—Notice Requirement

Brown Group argues Plaintiff’s RCRA claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff failed to comply with RCRA’s mandatory notice requirements. While it is unsettled whether the RCRA notice requirements are procedural or jurisdictional, there is no doubt that compliance with the notice requirements “is a mandatory, not optional, condition precedent for suit,” and dismissal is therefore the only remedy for failure to comply. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26 (1989). Such dismissal is without prejudice. See id. at 32. As Plaintiff raises two distinct RCRA claims, each with differing notice requirements, I address the claims separately.

1. Section 6972(a)(1)(A)

Under Section 6972(a)(1)(A), any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any other person who is alleged to be in violation of RCRA. No action may be commenced, however, until sixty days after the plaintiff gives notice of the violation to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the state in which the alleged violation occurs, and the violator himself. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1)(A). Brown Group does not argue Plaintiff failed to notice the EPA or the state.

Plaintiff commenced its RCRA action on April 25, 2008, by filing its Complaint [Docket # 1]. Accordingly, Plaintiff must have noticed the required parties no later than February 25, 2008. While Plaintiff sent Brown Group a notice letter on April 18, 2008, that letter was sent too
late to be considered “notice” under RCRA. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 26–27. I therefore consider only whether Plaintiff’s earlier notice letter of September 24, 2007 (“notice letter”), was sufficient. I find and conclude it was.

The notice to the alleged violator must include sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify: (1) the specific permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order which has allegedly been violated; (2) the activity alleged to constitute the violation; (3) the person or persons responsible for the alleged violation; (4) the date or dates of the violation; and (5) the full name, address, and telephone number of the person giving notice. 40 C.F.R. § 254.3(a). The notice letter at issue here states: “Among the many RCRA violations, Brown Group had owned and operated a treatment, storage, and disposal facility for listed hazardous waste without the necessary hazardous waste permit.” See 42 U.S.C. § 6925; COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-15-303. Although the notice letter identifies only one specific permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, or order which has allegedly been violated, it is sufficient to meet the first and second prongs of the notice inquiry. Likewise—because the term “person” under the RCRA is defined broadly to include “an individual, trust, firm, joint stock company, corporation (including a government corporation), partnership, [or] association,” see United States Dep’t of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 618–19 (1992); 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15)—the notice letter meets the third prong of the notice inquiry.

Although the notice letter does not state any particular date of the violation, the letter does limit the span of the alleged violation to a time period beginning on November 19, 1980, and ending on the unspecified date in 1983 when Plaintiff purchased the property from Brown Group. This is sufficient to meet the fourth prong of the notice inquiry. Finally, as the notice
letter is provided on letterhead from Plaintiff’s attorney that includes the attorney’s full name, address, and telephone number, this is sufficient to meet the fifth prong of the notice inquiry. Accordingly, the September 24, 2007, notice letter is sufficient under Section 6972(a)(1)(A).

2. Section 6972(a)(1)(B)

Under Section 6972(a)(1)(B), any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf against any other person who is contributing to, or has contributed to, the handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health of the environment. No action may be commenced, however, until ninety days after the plaintiff gives notice of the violation to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the state in which the alleged violation occurs, and the violator himself. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A). Like Plaintiff’s claim under Section 6972(a)(1)(A), only the September 24, 2007, notice letter will be considered to have been sent within the time period required under Section 6972(a)(1)(B).

Unlike Section 6972(a)(1)(A), Section 6972(a)(1)(B) does not have a corresponding regulation indicating the minimum requirements of the notice letter. Accordingly, I ask only whether the notice was sufficient to inform Brown Group of the nature of the ongoing problems on the facility site and of its potential responsibility for those problems, and whether the notice was sufficient to give Brown Group “an opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the Act and thus . . . render unnecessary a citizen suit.” See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174–75 (2000); Utah State Dep’t of Health v. Ng, 649 F. Supp. 1102, 1107–08 (D. Utah 1986). As the notice letter indicates Plaintiff’s intent to bring suit under Section 6972(a)(1)(B), lists specific chemicals dumped on the property, and indicates
the prior releases have ongoing health ramifications, the notice letter was sufficient under Section 6972(a)(1)(B). See Building & Constr. Trades Council of Buffalo v. Downtown Dev., Inc., 448 F.3d 138, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2006).

F. RCRA Section 6972(a)(1)(A)

Having determined Plaintiff provided adequate notice to Brown Group on both its Section 6972(a)(1)(A) and Section 6972(a)(1)(B) claims, I now turn to Brown Group’s arguments attacking the sufficiency of the claims themselves. Brown Group first argues Plaintiff’s Section 6972(a)(1)(A) claim should be dismissed because the claim is preempted by Plaintiff’s CERCLA claim. For the reasons stated above in reference to Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, Brown Group’s argument is likewise rejected here.

Under Section 6972(a)(1)(A), a citizen may commence suit on his own behalf against any person “who is alleged to be in violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). Brown Group argues it sold the property in 1983—and has conducted no activity on the property since—and therefore cannot be “alleged to be in violation” of RCRA. Brown Group argues its actions should be considered “wholly past violations” that do not give rise to suit under Section 6972(a)(1)(A). See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 58–64 (1987). I agree.

1. Definition of “to be in violation”

As noted by the Supreme Court in Gwaltney, “[t]he most natural reading of ‘to be in violation’ is a requirement that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or intermittent violation—that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the
future. Congress could have phrased its requirement in language that looked to the past (‘to have violated’), but it did not choose this readily available option.” *Gwaltney*, 484 U.S. at 57 (construing language in the Clean Water Act, which the Court noted was “identical [to] language in the citizen suit provisions of several other environmental statutes that authorize only prospective relief,” including RCRA Section 6972(a)(1)(A)). The Court then noted that, in adding a civil remedy under Section 6972(a)(1)(B), “Congress has demonstrated . . . that it knows how to avoid this prospective implication by using language that explicitly targets wholly past violations.” *See Gwaltney*, 484 U.S. at 57.

2. *What distinguishes a “wholly past violation” from a “continuous or intermittent violation”*

Although the *Gwaltney* decision established that the “to be in violation” language did not include “wholly past violations,” it did not clarify the line between “wholly past” violations and those that are “continuous or intermittent.” *See Sierra Club v. El Paso Gold Mines, Inc.*, 421 F.3d 1133, 1139 (10th Cir. 2005). The Tenth Circuit—discussing the identical language in the Clean Water Act—noted in *Sierra Club* that courts have made a distinction between those cases where “all that remained was the migration, decomposition, or diffusion of the pollutants” and those cases that alleged “contemporaneous discharge” of pollutants by the defendant. *See id.* at 1140. Only the latter are considered “continuous or intermittent.” *See id.*

Apparently conceding that the “to be in violation” language in Section 6972(a)(1)(A) is “primarily forward looking,” Plaintiff nonetheless argues that wholly past acts by prior owners or operators of polluting property should be considered “continuous violations” whenever the pollution has not been remediated. Plaintiff directs me to a 1998 opinion of this Court holding the “overwhelming majority” of courts “have found continuing violations for substantive
violations of the RCRA when the environmental harms caused by the violations are curable, even when the affirmative act that initiates the violation occurred on a single day.” See United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1159 (D. Colo. 1998). This Court then concluded “that the leaching of hazardous waste into the groundwater from [previously-contaminated] soil constitutes continuing disposal of hazardous waste.” See id. at 1159–60.

Power Engineering, however, did not arise under Section 6972(a)(1)(A), but rather under Sections 6928, 6934, and 6972. See United States v. Power Eng’g Co., 191 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 1999). These statutes do not require that a plaintiff allege the defendant “to be in violation” of the Act. For example, under Section 6928(a)(1), the EPA may proceed against a polluter whenever it determines “that any person has violated or is in violation of any requirement of this subchapter.” See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, Section 6934 allows the EPA to issue compliance orders whenever the EPA determines “hazardous waste is, or has been, stored, treated, or disposed of”—see 42 U.S.C. § 6934(a)(1) (emphasis added)—and Section 6973 allows the EPA to proceed “upon receipt of evidence that the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation or disposal of any solid waste or hazardous waste may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” See 42 U.S.C. § 6973(a) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court noted in Gwaltney, the existence of a “separate and distinct statutory provision” that allows the EPA to seek civil penalties for “wholly past” violations “supports rather than refutes our conclusion that citizens, unlike the Administrator, may seek civil penalties only in a suit brought to enjoin or otherwise abate an ongoing violation.” See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 58–59.

Rather than inquire whether the unremedied pollution in Power Engineering rendered the
defendant “to be in violation” of RCRA, the Court relied on the fact that the defendant continued
the activities that caused the contamination and refused to remedy the ongoing source of
contamination despite being in a position to do so. See Power Eng’g, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 1157–60.
This is a fundamentally different inquiry from that raised here—namely, whether a prior
violation that remains unremedied may form a basis for a citizen suit under Section
6972(a)(1)(A) even when the person initially responsible for the violation no longer owns or
operates the polluting facility. Inquiry on this question has met with mixed results in the federal
courts. Compare Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d
1305, 1313–16 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding no valid claim exists against a prior operator under
646, 656 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (holding a valid claim exists against a prior owner under Section
6972(a)(1)(A) “as long as no proper disposal procedures are put into effect or as long as the
waste has not been cleaned up and the environmental effects remain remediable”). Plaintiff
argues I should accept the holding in Beazer Materials and find that a “prior owner’s alleged
disposal of hazardous wastes on the property several years prior which continued to exist,
unremediated, was sufficient to state an ongoing violation of RCRA under section
6972(a)(1)(A).” This I decline to do.

While Plaintiff’s summary of Beazer Materials is accurate, I do not find the reasoning
persuasive. In reaching its conclusion that Section 6972(a)(1)(A) allows a civil suit for
violations against former property owners or operators, Beazer Materials relied on Gache v.
Town of Harrison, New York, an opinion of the Southern District of New York holding: “In
short, the disposal of wastes can constitute a continuing violation as long as no proper disposal
procedures are put into effect or as long as the waste has not been cleaned up and the
In *Gache*, however—as in *Power Engineering*—the defendant was the current owner and
operator of the contaminated property. See *Gache*, 813 F. Supp. at 1039–40. To the extent the
analysis in *Gache* could be extended to a former owner or operator, the subsequent opinion of
the Second Circuit—which is controlling on the Southern District of New York—in *Connecticut
Coastal Fishermen’s Association* clarified that when the owner or operator alleged to be in
violation of RCRA ceased operations before the suit was filed, any violations were “wholly past
violations” that do not give rise to suit under Section 6972(a)(1)(A). See *Connecticut Coastal
Fishermen’s Ass’n*, 989 F.2d at 1313, 1315. The remaining cases cited in *Beazer Materials*
likewise concern ongoing violations by an alleged current owner or operator and do not inform
52745 (E.D. Penn. Apr. 23, 1990); *North Carolina Wildlife Fed’n v. Woodbury*, No. 87-584-

The other cases cited by Plaintiff are also unpersuasive on the question whether a polluter
who no longer owns or operates the pollution site may still be subject to suit under Section
6972(a)(1)(A). For example, *Raymond K. Hoxsie Real Estate Trust v. Exxon Educational
Foundation* based its conclusion on the fact that the defendant was the owner of the underground
storage tank system at issue, even though no longer an owner of the overlaying property. See
Realty, Inc. v. Dresser Rand Co.*, the defendant was the current owner and operator of the
contaminated site. See *Cornerstone Realty*, 993 F. Supp. 107, 117 (D. Conn. 1998). Another
case relied upon by Plaintiff, *Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc.*—while facially concerning Section 6972(a)(1)(A)—based its holding on the plaintiff’s allegation that the defendants “contributed to the handling, transportation or disposal of solid or hazardous waste, which has created and presents an imminent or substantial endangerment to the public health or the environment.” *See Acme Printing, 812 F. Supp. 1498, 1512 (E.D. Wis. 1992).* This language indicates the claim was actually alleged under Section 6972(a)(1)(B), which allows suit against any person who “contributed . . . to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.”

While not cited by either party—perhaps because it addresses the identical language of the Clean Water Act, rather than RCRA—the court’s discussion in *Friends of Sakonnet v. Dutra* is well-reasoned and applicable to the question presented here. *See Friends of Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. 623 (D.R.I. 1990).* *Friends of Sakonnet* first restated the imprecise holding of *Gwaltney* that the “to be in violation” language “does not confer jurisdiction in citizens’ suits for wholly past violations.” *See Friends of Sakonnet, 738 F. Supp. at 632.* The court then noted “that holding was referring to the [alleged] violation of the Act being in the past.” *Id.* In *Friends of Sakonnet, however—as in this case:

the [alleged] violation of the Act has been continuing and was occurring when the suits . . . were filed. It is only a *violator*, not the *violation*, that can be said to be in the past. The distinction is not merely semantic. In the *Gwaltney* decision, no further polluting . . . [was] taking place because the violation ha[d] ceased; the purpose of the Act ha[d] been achieved. In the present Sakonnet situation, the polluting continues, although the actor polluting has changed.

*Id.* (emphasis in original). Accordingly, “[t]he question in the Sakonnet River situation is whether a person who has violated the Clean Water Act may avoid liability by relinquishing
ownership of a polluting source although the violation continues.” *Id.*

The *Friends of Sakonnet* court relied on the notice provisions of the Clean Water Act—which track the notice provisions of RCRA—and the Supreme Court’s conclusion that “the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in the present or the future, not the past.” *See Gwaltney*, 484 U.S. at 59; *Friends of Sakonnet*, 738 F. Supp. at 633. As noted by the Supreme Court in *Hallstrom*, the legislative history of the RCRA—like that of the Clean Water Act—“indicates an intent to strike a balance between encouraging citizen enforcement of environmental regulations and avoiding burdening the federal courts with excessive numbers of citizen suits.” *Hallstrom*, 493 U.S. at 29. Notice gives the Government the opportunity to compel compliance before suit and further gives the defendant the opportunity to bring itself into compliance—“and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit.” *Id.* (quoting *Gwaltney*, 484 U.S. at 60). The *Friends of Sakonnet* court concluded that the express provision of notice to allow a polluter to bring itself into compliance indicates Congress intended “[t]he phrase ‘any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation’ [to be] clearly directed to a present violation by the person against who the citizen suit is brought.” *See id.* at 632–33; *see also Gwaltney*, 484 U.S. at 59–60 (noting the statute should not be read in such a manner as to render the notice provisions gratuitous). Once a defendant is no longer an owner or operator of a polluting facility, it has “no control over the pollution source” and would have no ability to “bring itself into complete compliance.” *See Friends of Sakonnet*, 738 F. Supp. at 633. Requiring notice of a specific violation in such a situation would be gratuitous. *See id.*

Similar conclusions have been reached by other federal courts—with the notable exception of the wrongly-decided *Beazer Materials*—in the context of suit under Section

3. Brown Group is not “alleged to be in violation” of RCRA

A review of the second amended complaint shows Plaintiff does not allege Brown Group was a current owner or operator of a polluting property at the time this suit was brought. Brown Group’s polluting acts indisputably ceased no later than the date in 1983 when Plaintiff purchased the property. Plaintiff does not allege any special situations—such as the existence of underground storage tanks—that will impute an ownership interest to Brown Group despite Plaintiff owning the property. Accordingly, while the facts alleged show Plaintiff, as the owner and operator of an alleged hazardous waste site, may “be in violation of [a] permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has become effective pursuant to” RCRA—see Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 1289, 1302 (E.D. Wis. 1995)—Plaintiff alleges no facts showing Brown Group to be similarly in violation. Plaintiff’s Section 6972(a)(1)(A) claim is therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
G. RCRA Section 6972(a)(1)(B)

Brown Group first argues Plaintiff’s Section 6972(a)(1)(B) claim should be dismissed because the claim is preempted by Plaintiff’s CERCLA claim. For the reasons stated above in reference to Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim, Brown Group’s argument is likewise rejected here.

Under Section 6972(a)(1)(B), a citizen may commence suit on his own behalf “against any person, including . . . any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Brown Group does not dispute it falls within this category of persons. Brown Group argues, however, that Plaintiff’s claims for penalties under Section 6972(a)(1)(B) must be dismissed because Section 6972(a)(1)(B) allows only for injunctive relief.

Section 6972(a) provides: “The district court shall have jurisdiction . . . to restrain any person who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste referred to in paragraph (1)(B), to order such person to take such other action as may be necessary, or both.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a). Although Section 6928(g) provides that any person “who violates any requirement of this subchapter shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty in an amount not to exceed $25,000 for each violation,” RCRA does not provide any means for a Plaintiff to receive the benefit of the penalty. Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks the payment of civil penalties to
itself, such relief is unavailable under Section 6972(a)(1)(B). As it is not entirely clear from the
language of the Second Amended Complaint, however, whether Plaintiff seeks relief above that
allowed under the Act, I decline to grant Brown Group’s motion to dismiss a portion of
Plaintiff’s Section 6972(a)(1)(B) claim. See Res. Exploration & Min. Inc. v. Itel Corp., 492 F.
Supp. 515, 516 (D. Colo. 1980) (holding where “it is not clear that the complaint fails to state a
claim . . . a motion to dismiss should be denied”).

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Brown Group’s Motion to Dismiss [Docket # 57] is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows:

1. To the extent Plaintiff’s Third Claim for Relief alleges a claim for negligence per
    se, the claim is dismissed;

2. Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim for Relief for abnormally dangerous activity liability is
dismissed;

3. Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim for Relief for liability under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A) is
dismissed;

4. In all other respects, Brown Group’s motion is DENIED.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

Dated: February __18__, 2009.

BY THE COURT:

/s/Lewis T. Babcock
Lewis T. Babcock, Judge
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
ATLANTA DIVISION

SCARLETT & ASSOCIATES, INC.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

BRIARCLIFF CENTER PARTNERS,
LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.
1:05-CV-0145-CC

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Faison & Associates, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 151], Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint [Doc. No. 160], Third-Party Defendants’ Combined Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 161], and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 164]. For the reasons stated herein, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant Faison & Associates, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 151], DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint [Doc. No. 160], GRANTS in part, DENIES in part, and DENIES AS MOOT in part Third-Party Defendants’ Combined Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 161], and DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 164].

I. FACTS

This action arises from environmental contamination at a commercial property in DeKalb County, Georgia (the “Property”). Third-Party Defendants Roy S. Tuggle and Virginia E. Tuggle (the “Tuggles”) are the current owners of the Property, and the Tuggle family has owned the Property since 1921, along with

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1 The claim against Third-Party Defendant Patricia Chatham has been resolved and dismissed. Accordingly, the portion of the summary judgment motion addressing the claims asserted against Patricia Chatham is moot.
much of the surrounding property. On December 31, 1965, the Tuggles executed a lease with C & A Land Company, also known as C & A Properties, Inc., (“C & A”) granting to C & A the right to the use, occupation, and extensive control of the Property. As fee simple owners of the Property, the Tuggles retain certain control over the Property under the terms of the referenced lease. As amended on February 16, 1996, March 17, 1970, and April 25, 1966, the lease runs through March 13, 2019, with automatic renewal options for an additional 47 years.

As part of the distribution of the estate of C & A’s principal, R. Pierce Chatham, Plaintiff Scarlett & Associates, Inc. (“Scarlett”) assumed all property rights under the lease on January 6, 1995. Scarlett was incorporated on December 28, 1994, for the sole purpose of holding the interest to the Property under the lease. Scarlett, as C & A’s “heir and successor in interest,” controls the Property and has assumed C & A’s liabilities. Scarlett’s interest in the Property remains its sole asset.

The Property consists of two areas of concern. The area that remains of concern in this litigation is a strip mall known as Briarcliff Station Shopping Center (the “Shopping Center”), where a dry cleaning business operated. There were several owners and operators of the dry cleaning business between 1986 and 2007:

(a) Defendants Retail Centers, Ltd. and Briarcliff Station Associates, Ltd. leased the Shopping Center from C & A beginning in 1986, and sublet the dry cleaner space to Defendant SHS Equipment Sales, Inc. (“SHS”).

(b) SHS operated the dry cleaning business from 1986 to 1992.

(c) In 1992, Atlanta Enterprises, Inc., owned by Defendant Mohammad M. Ali, took over the dry cleaning business under the trade name Regal Custom Cleaners.

(d) In 1995, after Defendant Briarcliff Station Associates, Ltd. failed to make payments to its lender, AmSouth Bank of Florida (“AmSouth”), Scarlett leased the Shopping Center directly to AmSouth.

(e) In May 1997, AmSouth renewed Atlanta Enterprises’ lease for the dry
cleaner space.

(f) In September 1997, AmSouth sold the Shopping Center Ground Lease to Defendant Briarcliff Center Partners, LLC.

(g) In October 1998, Defendant Briarcliff Center Partners, LLC sublet the dry cleaner space to Defendant Aslam Mohammad, who continued dry cleaning operations until July 2007.

Contamination at the Property was discovered in the early to mid 1990s as a result of a series of environmental investigations performed in association with the administration of the estate of R. Pierce Chatham. The Property was held in trust by NationsBank while the estate was tied up in litigation from 1989 to 1994. During that time period, NationsBank hired an environmental consultant, PSI, to initiate an environmental investigation of the Property for purposes of its administration and distribution under the estate. The investigations revealed the Property was contaminated with tetrachloroethene, commonly known as "PCE,” which is the primary cleaning solvent used by dry cleaners, as well as other hazardous substances and constituents. Based on the results of the investigation, on June 27, 1994, NationsBank, on behalf of C & A, issued a Release Notification for the Property as required under the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act (“HSRA”). In November 1994, NationsBank, on behalf of C & A, again notified the Georgia Environmental Protection Division (“GEPD”) of the contamination. All of these actions occurred prior to Scarlett’s assumption of the lease of the Property on January 6, 1995.

The date of the original release of PCE is unknown.2 However, as mentioned

2 Defendant Faison & Associates, LLC objects to this statement of fact on the ground that the evidence cited by Scarlett in support of the statement, the Affidavit of Charles H. MacPherson, Jr., is inadmissible due to the lack of personal knowledge of Mr. MacPherson. Indeed, in response to several statements set forth in Scarlett’s Statement of Additional Material Facts, Faison contends that both the expert report and affidavit of Mr. MacPherson are inadmissible due to lack of personal knowledge. However, this Court
above, a dry cleaning facility has been in operation on the Property since 1986. According to the environmental investigations, the PCE was released from both surface discharge in and around the dry cleaning operations inside the Shopping Center and from surface disposal outside the Shopping Center from the dry cleaning operations. The impacted soils are located directly beneath the dry cleaning unit, waste storage area, and water valve boxes outside and behind the building. A PCE groundwater plume was identified and is associated with the impacted soils at the dry cleaning facility. The PCE plume has been continually migrating and expanding. Operations at the dry cleaning facility through 2007 resulted in continued releases of PCE on the site.

On April 10, 1996, GEPD placed the Property on the Georgia Hazardous Site Inventory ("HSI"). Since assuming the lease from C & A, Scarlett has undertaken a series of response and investigation actions on the site from 1996 to the present day, including submission of Compliance Status Reports (including revisions) ("CSRs") and a Correction Action Plan ("CAP") to remediate and address the PCE contamination on the site. Even so, beginning in December 1997, GEPD notified the legally responsible parties, including Scarlett, of their liability for the contamination, and in several instances ordered responsible parties to investigate and remediate the contamination.

GEPD's actions against the responsible parties are summarized as follows:

(a) On December 30, 1997, GEPD notified Scarlett and the Tuggles that they are responsible for the contamination.

previously has held that personal knowledge may arise from a review and understanding of documents related to the case. See Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County, No. 1:02-cv-01862-ODE, 2007 WL 2819519, at *1, 9-10 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 27, 2004). Because Mr. MacPherson's statements and opinions are based on his review of the environmental investigation reports and his extensive knowledge in this area, the Court finds that Mr. MacPherson's report and affidavit are based on his personal knowledge and that the report and affidavit are therefore admissible.
(b) In 1998, GEPD entered an Administrative Order against Scarlett requiring completion of the CSR and implementation of a CAP.

(c) On November 5, 1998, GEPD notified Defendants Briarcliff Center Partners, LLC and Mohammad M. Ali that they are responsible for the contamination.

(d) On May 3, 1999, following Scarlett's submission of an Abbreviated CSR in February 1999, GEPD ordered Scarlett and the Tuggles to take certain actions to address the contamination.

(e) On June 2, 1999, GEPD entered into a Consent Order with Defendant Briarcliff Center Partners, LLC under which it was required to take certain actions to address the contamination.

(f) On December 6, 1999, GEPD identified Michelin North America Inc. and Retail Centers, Ltd. as responsible parties.

(g) On January 19, 2005, in an enforcement action, GEPD sought a $50,000 penalty against Scarlett for its failure to comply with the Administrative Order. A similar action was brought against the Tuggles contemporaneously.

(h) On August 18, 2005, GEPD and Scarlett entered into a Consent Order, pursuant to which Scarlett agreed to undertake and complete investigation, remediation and clean-up of the site.

In accordance with the Consent Order entered into by Scarlett and GEPD, Scarlett submitted a CAP, which GEPD approved on June 13, 2006. (More recently, the CAP was amended to address changed conditions and was once again approved by GEPD; corrective action is currently being implemented on the site.) Within the Consent Order, Scarlett asserted that it had agreed "to indemnify, hold harmless, and otherwise assume all burdens, obligations, liabilities, and rights of the owners of the Property." (Doc. No. 161-10, p. 3.) Based upon Scarlett's entry into the Consent Order and Scarlett's representations made therein, GEPD dismissed its
enforcement action against the Tuggles. Scarlett’s indemnification of the Tuggles was formalized with a contractual agreement in August 2008.

With respect to the relevant involvement of Defendant Faison & Associates, LLC ("Faison") with the Shopping Center, on September 1, 1995, shortly after Scarlett and AmSouth entered into a Ground Lease for the Shopping Center, AmSouth and Faison entered into an agreement under which Faison agreed to perform certain property management services regarding the Shopping Center. Faison served in this capacity until approximately September 1, 1997, when its involvement with the Shopping Center ended. Contrary to Scarlett’s allegation in the Complaint that Faison was a “primary subleasee” of the Property, Scarlett now admits that Faison has never been a party to any lease involving any portion of the Property. Scarlett admits that Faison did not maintain an office or personnel at the Shopping Center, had no access to keys to any leased space, and had no authority to evict tenants.

Scarlett and Faison otherwise dispute the scope of Faison’s role and responsibilities. Faison asserts that it served only in a limited capacity, never managed any tenant operations, had no control over which tenants were permitted to lease space, and had no control over hazardous substance handling by any tenant, including the dry cleaner. Faison further states that, as is typical at a retail strip mall, Faison’s principal responsibilities were to attempt to rent space to tenants that were approved by AmSouth, collect rent, maintain the common areas of the Shopping Center, pay bills in a timely manner, and send any excess revenues to AmSouth. Scarlett, on the other hand, emphasizes that the Management Agreement between AmSouth and Faison provides that Faison was hired “to supervise and to manage the operation of the [Shopping Center] and as the exclusive leasing agent thereof.” (Doc. No. 163-2, p. 1.) Scarlett additionally points out that Faison had the following specific duties: (a) obtaining all necessary governmental approval and permits and performing such acts necessary to effect AmSouth’s compliance with
all laws applicable to the operation of the Shopping Center; (b) negotiating and entering into contracts on behalf of AmSouth and on terms approved by AmSouth with, and supervising the performance of, all independent contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, and servicing agents, required for the proper management, leasing, maintenance, repair, and operation of the Shopping Center and the construction of tenant improvements; (c) maintaining financial and business books and records for AmSouth; (d) soliciting, negotiating, causing to be prepared, and executing tenant leases and renewals and extensions of tenant leases for space in the Shopping Center upon such terms and conditions as Faison deemed appropriate; (e) paying all independent contractors, architects, engineers, subcontractors, suppliers, and service agents utilized in management, operation, maintenance, or repair of the Shopping Center or construction of tenant improvements; (f) purchasing all necessary supplies and equipment for the proper operation, maintenance, repair and restoration of the Shopping Center and the construction of tenant improvements; (g) making or causing to be made all repairs, replacements, renovations, and capital improvements on the Shopping Center approved by AmSouth; (h) making arrangements for and paying all charges owed by AmSouth for all utilities used in the operation of the Shopping Center; (i) filing all real and personal ad valorem property tax returns required to be filed by AmSouth and paying all ad valorem taxes on and assessments against the Shopping Center that are required to be paid by AmSouth; (j) receiving and collecting rent from all tenants and bringing legal action against any tenants or occupants to collect any past due rent or charges or to enforce the terms of any tenant lease; (k) repairing or restoring the Shopping Center in the event of damage or destruction; (l) furnishing to the tenants of the Shopping Center all services as are usually or customarily furnished or rendered in connection with the rental of space in such a shopping center; and (m) taking all action deemed advisable for the efficient and economic management, leasing, operation, and maintenance of the Shopping Center.
Faison also was responsible for maintaining the books of account, preparing monthly financial and operating statements, and preparing the annual operating budget. According to the lease with Atlanta Enterprises, Faison was the contact for AmSouth. Faison also took responsibility for ensuring that the operators of the dry cleaning business complied with the Environmental Protection Agency’s reporting requirements on dry cleaning facilities covering PCE emissions, equipment monitoring and repair, and accounting of PCE consumption.

In addition to the foregoing, Scarlett points out that AmSouth was named as a Potentially Responsible Party ("PRP") by GEPD on March 23, 1999, by virtue of its lease interest in the Shopping Center where the dry cleaning facility was located. In response, AmSouth argued that it was entitled to the Secured Creditor Exemption under the HSRA. In support of its arguments to GEPD, AmSouth represented to GEPD that: (a) AmSouth acquired the Note and Deed to Secure Debt of the Shopping Center after Briarcliff Station Associates, Ltd. defaulted under its construction loan for the Shopping Center; (b) AmSouth entered into a sublease of the Shopping Center with Scarlett in August 1995 after Briarcliff Station Associates, Ltd. defaulted under the terms of the lease; (c) AmSouth hired Faison to manage the Shopping Center until AmSouth’s interest in the Shopping Center was sold in July 1997; (d) AmSouth was the sublessee of Scarlett and took on the indicia of ownership under the sublease for the sole purpose of protecting its security interest by exercising its right to receive rental income from the property; (e) AmSouth’s involvement with the Shopping Center was entirely through Faison, which conducted only normal maintenance, management, and marketing activities; and (f) AmSouth’s involvement with the dry cleaning business was through Faison and was limited to collection of money under the dry cleaner’s rental agreement, repair of the dry cleaner’s roof, and execution of a lease with the new owners of the business. Subsequently, AmSouth produced certain documents to demonstrate its lack of direct involvement with the Shopping Center, which included “Faison
Monthly Management Reports for Briarcliff Station Shopping Center” and the Management Agreement with Faison. GEPD entered an Administrative Order against AmSouth on December 6, 1999, requiring AmSouth to take certain actions to address the contamination at the Shopping Center. On February 15, 2000, GEPD extended the time for AmSouth to comply with the terms of the Administrative Order and also requested information necessary to determine the status of AmSouth under the Secured Creditor Exemption of HSRA. On August 10, 2001, GEPD found that AmSouth qualified for the Secured Creditor Exemption based on information provided by Hollene Darby of Faison.

II. STANDARD

Summary judgment is proper where the record establishes “that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue of fact is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). It is ‘genuine’ if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).

In applying this standard, the district court must view the evidence and all factual inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). However, the nonmoving party “may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response must--by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule--set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant].” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
III. FAISON’S AND SCARLETT’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SCARLETT’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT

A. CERCLA and HSRA Claims

Scarlett’s principal claims against Faison are for cost recovery under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, as amended ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), and CERCLA’s state counterpart, the Georgia Hazardous Site Response Act ("HSRA"), O.C.G.A. § 12-8-90 et seq. Scarlett also asserts a CERCLA “contribution” claim under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) and (g). Faison moves the Court for summary judgment on all of these claims. Scarlett opposes Faison’s motion and requests that the Court enter summary judgment in its favor.

1. Contribution Claim

With respect to the “contribution” claim, Scarlett does not dispute that this claim must be dismissed due to Scarlett’s lack of standing to maintain it. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 166-68, 125 S. Ct. 577, 160 L. Ed. 2d 548 (2004) (holding that a plaintiff may not maintain a CERCLA contribution claim unless there is an ongoing or completed government CERCLA action against the plaintiff). Accordingly, without the need for further discussion or analysis, the Court deems the “contribution” claim abandoned and grants Faison summary judgment on this claim. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Dunmar Corp., 43 F.3d 587, 599 (11th Cir. 1995) ("[G]rounds alleged in the complaint but not relied upon in summary judgment are deemed abandoned.") (citations omitted); Burnett v. Northside Hosp., 342 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1140 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (plaintiff’s failure to address a challenged claim on summary judgment warranted dismissal of that claim); Bute v. Schuller Int’l, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 1473, 1477 (N.D. Ga. 1998) ("Because plaintiff has failed to respond to this argument or otherwise address this claim, the Court deems it abandoned."); Welch v. Delta Air Lines, 978 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (N.D. Ga. 1997) ("Plaintiff’s failure to respond to [d]efendant’s argument alone entitles
[defendant to summary judgment on these claims.

2. **Cost Recovery Claims**

CERCLA and HSRA incorporate the same definitions and liability standards. *Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A. (South)*, 183 F.3d 1269, 1272 n. 3 (11th Cir. 1999). An essential element of the claims under CERCLA and HSRA requires Scarlett to prove that Faison is a "covered person." *Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments*, 94 F.3d 1489, 1496-97 (11th Cir. 1996). Scarlett also must prove that the property at issue is a "facility," that a release of hazardous substances has occurred, and that Scarlett has incurred response costs consistent with the National Contingency Plan. *Id.* at 1496. These latter elements of the CERCLA and HSRA claims are not at issue for purposes of the summary judgment motions pending before the Court. Rather, the only dispute is whether Faison is a "covered person."

Title 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) sets forth the following categories of "covered persons":

(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,

(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,

(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and

(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance.]

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). In the instant action, Scarlett asserts that Faison is liable as both an owner of the Shopping Center and an operator of the dry cleaning facility at the time of disposal of hazardous substances at the Shopping Center.
a. Owner Liability

Scarlett argues that Faison is liable as an owner of the Shopping Center, although Scarlett did not specifically allege such in its Complaint. Plaintiff has moved the Court for leave to amend its Complaint to emphasize its theory of owner liability, and the parties have briefed the issue of owner liability on summary judgment. Based on the evidence presented by the parties, Scarlett’s theory of owner liability is without merit.

Under both CERCLA and HSRA, the definition of “owner” of contaminated property is any person “owning” such property. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii); O.C.G.A. § 12-8-92(7). The term “owner” is to be given its “ordinary meaning[].” Monarch Tile, Inc. v. City of Florence, 212 F.3d 1219, 1221-22 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “The question of whether a particular defendant can be deemed an ‘owner’ under CERCLA [and HSRA] turns on application of state law....” Canadyne-Georgia Corp., 183 F.3d at 1273 (citation omitted). Thus, if Faison is not an “owner” of the Shopping Center under Georgia law, it is not an “owner” under CERCLA or HSRA. See Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1497-1505.

Based on the ordinary meaning of “owner,” the Court concludes that Faison is not an “owner” or former “owner” of the Shopping Center. There is no dispute that fee simple ownership of the Shopping Center has been held at all relevant times by the Tuggles. In 1965, the Tuggles leased the Shopping Center to C & A. Scarlett inherited C & A’s property rights under the lease in 1995. The Shopping Center was sublet to Defendant Retail Centers, Ltd., and the sublease was assigned to Defendant Briarcliff Station Associates, Ltd. Briarcliff Station Associates, Ltd. in turn sub-sub-leased a portion of the Shopping Center to a series of sub-sub-tenants that operated a dry cleaning business that contributed to the contamination. In August 1995, after Briarcliff Station Associates, Ltd. defaulted on the loan given by AmSouth, Scarlett sub-leased the shopping center to AmSouth. The sub-sub-tenants continued operating the dry cleaner business. In September 1995, AmSouth hired Faison as the
property manager. On September 1, 1997, AmSouth assigned its sublease to Defendant Briarcliff Center Partners, LLC, at which time Faison’s involvement with the Shopping Center ceased. Based on these undisputed facts, Faison never “owned” the Shopping Center under the “ordinary meaning” of “owner.” Monarch Tile, 212 F.3d at 1221-22.

Scarlett argues that Faison, as the company hired by AmSouth to supervise and manage the operation of the Shopping Center, stood in the shoes of AmSouth and thus is liable as an owner. In support of this argument, Scarlett relies on several federal cases from outside the Eleventh Circuit holding that a lessee may, under some circumstances, be considered a CERCLA “owner.” See Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods Indus., Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1384, 1391 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (holding that lessee is considered “owner” for purposes of § 9607(a)(1) because lessee asserted control over the use of the property); United States v. A & N Cleaners and Launderers, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1317, 1331-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“The undisputed facts establish that [lessee] exercised a degree of site control over the Property, that, under this definition, confers ownership status upon it for purposes of CERCLA § 107(a).”); United States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1003 (D.S.C. 1984) (holding liable as owner under CERCLA a lessee/sublessor who “maintained control over and responsibility for the use of the property and, essentially, stood in the shoes of the property owner”), aff’d in part, vac’d in part, United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988). Even if the Court found these cases persuasive, Faison’s activities at the Shopping Center do not subject it to owner liability even under the standard set forth in these cases.

The cases relied on by Scarlett in support of its owner liability theory inform that a court should look at the degree of site control that a lessee asserted or exercised to determine the lessee’s liability as an owner. Woods Indus., Inc., 815 F. Supp. at 1391; A & N Cleaners and Launderers, Inc., 788 F. Supp. at 1332; South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. at 1003. Here, Faison, which was
not even a lessee, did not have or exercise sufficient control over the Shopping Center to be liable as an owner. Most importantly, although Faison had the authority to solicit, to negotiate, to cause to be prepared, and to execute tenant leases, the Management Agreement between AmSouth and Faison precluded Faison from entering into or renewing any tenant lease or committing AmSouth to a tenant lease without the prior written authorization of AmSouth. (Management Agreement [Doc. No. 163-2] §§ 3.1(d), 4.2) Hence, unlike the facts presented in the cases relied on by Scarlett where owner liability was found, Faison did not have ultimate control over the use of the premises. Rather, AmSouth made the final determination regarding what businesses would be permitted to lease space at the Shopping Center and was, in fact, the party that signed the tenant leases. (See Shopping Center Lease Between AmSouth Bank of Florida and Atlanta Enterprises, Inc. [Doc. No. 163-14].) There is no evidence that Faison was ever a party to any lease with the dry cleaning business or any other tenant at the Shopping Center. Similarly, while Faison had authority to negotiate with and enter into contracts with independent contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, and servicing agents on behalf of AmSouth, the terms of the contracts had to be approved by AmSouth. (Management Agreement § 3.1(b)(2).) Further, while Faison was responsible for making or causing to be made all repairs, replacements, renovations, and capital improvements, the Management Agreement required Faison to obtain AmSouth’s prior written authorization to expend any sums or to incur any obligation for the expenditure of sums with respect to any item of expense that was not included in the annual budget or with respect to any instance of maintenance, repair, or alteration of the Shopping Center in an amount exceeding $2,500.00. (Management Agreement §§ 3.1(h), 4.3.) Moreover, the annual budget itself was subject to AmSouth’s written approval. (Management Agreement § 5.4(a).) Thus, AmSouth retained significant control over the repairs, replacements, renovations, and capital improvements at the Shopping Center. Faison also had responsibility under the Management Agreement to obtain
and keep in effect adequate and sufficient policies of insurance for the Shopping Center, but these policies had to be of the types and in the amounts acceptable to AmSouth. (Management Agreement § 3.1(k).) In sum, Faison had many duties related to the operation of the Shopping Center, but AmSouth remained in ultimate control of the Shopping Center and the manner in which it would be used. In these circumstances, and notwithstanding any representations that AmSouth made to GEPD that may have led GEPD not to deem AmSouth a responsible party for the environmental contamination, the Court does not find that Faison exercised the requisite degree of control over the Shopping Center to be deemed an owner of the Shopping Center. Since Scarlett’s owner theory of liability is without legal merit, an amendment to the Complaint to emphasize owner liability would be futile and will not be permitted. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962) (holding that futility is a valid reason for denying motion to amend); Brewer-Girogio v. Producers Video, Inc., 216 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2000) (same).

b. Operator Liability

Scarlett next contends that Faison is a former “operator” of the dry cleaning business and that Faison therefore is a “covered person.” CERCLA generally defines an operator as “any person ... operating [a covered] facility.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A)(ii). The Supreme Court refined the rather circuitous definition of “operator” in United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 141 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1998). According to Bestfoods, “under CERCLA, an operator is simply someone who directs the workings of, manages, or conducts the affairs of the facility.” Id. at 66. “[A]n operator must manage, direct, or conduct operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations having to do with leakage or disposal of hazardous waste, or decisions about compliance with environmental regulations.” Id. at 66-67. Following Bestfoods, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “operator” status requires that a party be “actually involved in operations involving leakage or disposal of hazardous waste.” Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 463 F.3d 1201, 1206
Scarlett contends that the Bestfoods analysis and its definition of “operator” are limited to the parent-subsidiary or corporate liability context, but this Court disagrees. Although the Supreme Court addressed in Bestfoods “whether a parent corporation that actively participated in, and exercised control over, the operations of a subsidiary may, without more, be held liable as an operator of a polluting facility owned or operated by the subsidiary,” id. at 55, the Supreme Court supplied the definition of “operator” in the context of evaluating the parent corporation’s direct liability for the environmental contamination at issue in the case, id. at 66. Since Bestfoods, numerous courts properly have utilized this definition to determine issues of liability under CERCLA outside of the parent-subsidiary context. See, e.g., United States v. Township of Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 313-16 (6th Cir. 1998); City of Waukegan, Illinois v. National Gypsum Co., 560 F. Supp. 2d 636, 642-46 (N.D. Ill. 2008); City of Wichita, Kansas v. Trustees of the APCO Oil Corp. Liquidating Trust, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1054 (D. Kan. 2003). Insofar as this Court does not read Bestfoods to limit its definition of “operator” to the parent-subsidiary context, the Court holds that the definition of “operator” supplied in Bestfoods is controlling and will apply that definition in this case.3

The evidence of record discloses a genuine dispute between the parties as to whether Faison acted as “operator” of the dry cleaning business within the meaning supplied by the Supreme Court in Bestfoods for the term “operator.” In support of its argument that it was not an “operator,” Faison relies on the deposition testimony of Patricia Chatham, the president and sole owner of Scarlett, who testified that she

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3 The Court agrees with Faison that the “operator” test set forth in Bestfoods supplants the “operator” test that the Eleventh Circuit previously set forth in Redwing Carriers, as the Redwing Carriers test, unlike the Bestfoods test, did not require that the alleged operator have engaged in activities specifically related to pollution. See Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1504-05.
had no knowledge of any evidence that Faison managed, directed or conducted any operations at the dry cleaning business, that Faison was involved in handling hazardous materials, or that Faison stored, collected, transported, or disposed of any hazardous materials. Faison also relies on the Declaration of P. Robert Jackson, the Vice President of AmSouth during the relevant time period, who attested that Faison did not manage or control tenant operations at the Shopping Center and had no authority to evict tenants. Significantly, however, Scarlett presents evidence that Faison played at least a minimal role in managing the dry cleaner’s operations specifically related to pollution. In this regard, Hollene M. Darby, on behalf of Faison, sent the dry cleaner a certified letter advising the dry cleaner of reporting requirements of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”). In order to document Faison’s files and insure governmental compliance, Ms. Darby requested copies of the documentation that the dry cleaner was required to provide to the EPA or an explanation as to why the dry cleaner was exempt from providing such documentation. This correspondence sent by Faison, combined with the other evidence of record indicating that Faison generally was responsible for managing and maintaining the Shopping Center and performing all acts necessary to effect AmSouth’s compliance with all laws, rules, ordinances, statutes, and regulations of any governmental authority applicable to the operation of the Shopping Center, is sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether Faison managed the operations of the dry cleaner specifically related to pollution and whether Faison therefore meets the definition of a former “operator.” Based on the presence of this genuine dispute, the Court denies both parties’ respective requests for summary judgment.

B. RCRA Claims

Scarlett also asserts claims against Faison under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 et seq. RCRA “is a comprehensive environmental statute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste.” Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483, 116 S. Ct. 1251,
134 L. Ed. 2d 121 (1996). RCRA allows a private plaintiff to sue two types of defendants: (1) a party "in violation of any [RCRA] permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition or order" and/or (2) a "past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A)-(B). Scarlett asserts both types of RCRA claims in this litigation.

1. Statute of Limitations

Faison maintains that the RCRA claims are time-barred. The Court disagrees. Federal environmental statutes that do not contain their own statute of limitations, such as the RCRA, are subject to the general five-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2462. E.g., National Parks and Conservation Ass'n, Inc. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 502 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying 28 U.S.C. § 2462 to bar claim under Clean Water Act). The five-year limitation period established by 28 U.S.C. § 2462 begins to run on "the date that a violation first occurs." Id. If the violation continues within the limitations period, however, the statute of limitations is tolled for a claim that otherwise would be time-barred. Id. ("Under the continuing violations doctrine, the statute of limitations is tolled for a claim that otherwise would be time-barred where the violation giving rise to the claim continues to occur within the limitations period.").

As Scarlett argues, a number of federal district courts have held that the continued presence of illegally dumped hazardous wastes may constitute a "current violation" of a RCRA regulation or standard, despite the fact that the operator's conduct occurred in the past. See Marrero Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 597 F. Supp. 2d 272, 283 (D.P.R. 2009) (holding that unremedied, migrating contamination is not a wholly past violation); Cameron v. Peach County, GA, No. 5:02-CV-41-1 (CAR), 2004 WL 5520003, at *26-27 (M.D. Ga. June 28, 2004) (holding
that the continued presence of illegal contamination that remains remedial
cannot constitute a continuing violation, even though the acts of unlawful disposal
occurred in the past); California v. M & P Invs., 308 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1146-47 (E.D.
Cal. 2003) (holding that a continuous violation under RCRA is present where
improperly discharged hazardous wastes “continue to exist unremediated” at the
contamination site); Aurora Nat’l Bank v. Tri Star Marketing, Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1020,
1025 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (“Although subsection (a)(1)(A) does not permit a citizen suit
for wholly past violations of the statute, the continued presence of illegally dumped
materials generally constitutes a ‘continuous violation’ of the RCRA, which is
cognizable under § 6972(a)(1)(A).”) (internal citation omitted); City of Toledo v.
valid claim exists against a prior owner under § 6972(a)(1)(A) “as long as no proper
disposal procedures are put into effect or as long as the waste has not been cleaned
up and the environmental effects remain remediable.”); Gache v. Town of Harrison,
continue to exist unremediated represent a continuing violation of RCRA.”); Acme
includes in its broad definition of ‘disposal’ the continuous leaking of hazardous
substances.... Accordingly, leaking of hazardous substances may constitute a
continuous or intermittent violation of RCRA.”); Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk,
No. 89-8644, 1990 WL 52745, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990) (“If a person disposes of
hazardous waste on a parcel of property, the hazardous waste remains in that
property insidiously infecting the soil and groundwater aquifers. In other words,
the violation continues until the proper disposal procedures are put into effect or the
hazardous waste is cleaned up.”). But see Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n
v. Remington Arms Co., Inc., 989 F.2d 1305, 1315 (2d Cir.1993) (holding that lead
shot and clay target debris previously deposited into Long Island Sound by trap and
skeet shoot club, although decomposing and contaminating wildlife, did not

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constitute "present violation" of RCRA for purposes of citizen's suit under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)); Board of County Com'rs of County of La Plata, Colorado v. Brown Group Retail, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1201-02 (D. Colo. 2009) (holding that a polluter who no longer owns or operates a pollution site is not subject to suit under § 6972(a)(1)(A)); Coburn v. Sun Chem. Corp., No. 88-0120, 1988 WL 120739, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 1988) (ongoing violation was not established with respect to a past operator of a facility that lacked permits for storage of hazardous waste). As the Middle District of Georgia recognized in Cameron, the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the issue of whether the continued presence of migrating waste constitutes a continuing violation under the RCRA. 2004 WL 5520003, at *27. In the absence of such Eleventh Circuit authority, and because the Court agrees with the analysis of the courts in the cases cited above, this Court, like the Cameron court, will follow the majority rule.

In the case at bar, specifically, Scarlett has presented evidence from environmental investigations indicating the continuous expansion and migration of the PCE plume since it was discovered in the early to mid 1990s. These investigations also indicated active ongoing releases of hazardous substances from the operation of the dry cleaning facility during the time period that Faison managed the Shopping Center on behalf of AmSouth. There is no dispute that the PCE contamination has not yet been cleaned up and the environmental damage has not been sufficiently remedied. As such, the Court holds that the contamination of the property from PCE remains an ongoing RCRA violation. The RCRA claims are not time-barred.

2. The RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(A) Claim

An actionable claim under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(A) requires that, at the time litigation is commenced, the defendant be engaged in a "continuous or ongoing violation" of a RCRA permit or other requirement. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1011 n. 20 (11th Cir. 2004). Scarlett alleges in this action that when
suit was filed in January 2005, all defendants were in violation of RCRA's open dumping prohibition and RCRA regulations governing the operation of a hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facility. Scarlett further alleges that the violations stem from the continued discharge and presence of materials allegedly disposed of prior to this lawsuit.

a. Open Dumping

Under the RCRA, “any solid waste management practice or disposal of solid waste which constitute the open dumping of solid waste or hazardous waste is prohibited....” 42 U.S.C. § 6945(a). This prohibition is enforceable “against persons engaged in the act of open dumping.” Id.; see also Cox v. City of Dallas, Texas, No. 3:98-CV-0291-H, 1999 WL 33756552, at *12 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 4, 1999) (“Section 6945(a), by its terms, only authorizes suits against those persons ‘engaged in the act of open dumping.’”). In the case at bar, the record is devoid of evidence that Faison itself ever “engaged in the act of open dumping.” Accordingly, Faison is entitled to summary judgment on the open dumping claim. See Cox, 1999 WL 33756552, at *12 (holding that City of Dallas was not liable for violating prohibition against open dumping because there was no evidence that the City of Dallas had engaged in the act of open dumping itself).

b. Operation of Hazardous Waste Facility

Scarlett’s Section 6972(a)(1)(A) claim is likewise based on the allegation that when this action was commenced, Faison was “operating” a hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facility in violation of RCRA regulations. As with the CERCLA and HSRA claims, Faison asserts that it is not liable as an operator under the RCRA. Both parties agree and case law indicates that the definition of operator is the same under RCRA and CERCLA. LeClercq v. Lockformer Co., No. 00 C 7164, 2002 WL 908037, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2002) (“[T]he statutory definition of ‘owner’ and ‘operator’ are the same under RCRA and CERCLA, and the standards for owner and operator liability under the two statutes are identical.”)

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(citing Taglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1574 (5th Cir. 1988)). Accordingly, the Court's prior analysis regarding whether Faison is liable as an operator applies equally to the RCRA claims. For the reasons set forth supra, the Court finds that there is a genuine dispute of fact as to Faison's liability as an operator.

Further, even though Faison's involvement with the Shopping Center ended on or about September 1, 1997, as discussed previously above, many courts have concluded that the failure of a past owner or operator to remedy past contamination and to comply with regulations in connection with past contamination can constitute a continuous violation under § 6972(a)(1)(A), particularly when the contamination is shown to be migrating. See Marrero Hernandez, 597 F. Supp. 2d at 283; Cameron, 2004 WL 5520003, at *26-27; M & P Investments, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1146-48; Aurora Nat'l Bank, Inc., 990 F. Supp. at 1025; Gache, 819 F. Supp. at 1041; Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. at 656; Acme Printing Ink Co., 812 F. Supp. at 1512; Fallowfield Dev. Corp., 1990 WL 52745, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 23, 1990). As stated supra, Scarlett, has presented evidence in this case from environmental investigations indicating the continuous expansion and migration of the PCE plume since it was discovered in the early to mid 1990s. These investigations also indicated active ongoing releases of hazardous substances from the operation of the dry cleaning facility during the time period that Faison managed the Shopping Center on behalf of AmSouth. There is no dispute that the PCE contamination has not yet been cleaned up and the environmental damage has not been sufficiently remedied.

In sum, then, the genuine dispute of fact as to whether Faison is liable as an operator precludes entry of summary judgment in favor of either Scarlett or Faison on this claim under § 6972(a)(1)(A), notwithstanding the fact that Faison ceased its involvement at the Shopping Center on or about September 1, 1997.

3. **The RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B) Claim**

Scarlett also sues under RCRA § 6972(a)(1)(B), which allows a citizen suit
against a “past or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). For this claim to survive Faison’s request for summary judgment, there must be evidence that Faison was an “operator” of the dry cleaning business and that Faison’s conduct “contributed to” handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of PCE. Id.

Faison first argues, as it has previously, that it never “operated” the dry cleaning business. For the reasons discussed supra, the Court finds a genuine dispute regarding whether Faison was an “operator” of the dry cleaning business.

However, based on the great weight of authority interpreting this statutory provision, the Court agrees with Faison that there is no evidence that Faison has contributed to or is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of PCE. The Eleventh Circuit has not yet had an occasion to address the precise circumstances in which an owner or operator meets the requirement of having contributed to or contributing to the handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste. However, the Seventh Circuit recently addressed this exact issue in Sycamore Industrial Park Associates v. Ericsson, Inc., 546 F.3d 847 (7th Cir. 2008) and held as follows:

A plain reading of the “has contributed or is contributing” language of § 6972(a)(1)(B) compels us to find that RCRA requires active involvement in handling or storage of materials for liability. The ordinary meaning of “contribute” is “to act as a determining factor.” Webster’s II New College Dictionary (2005). By definition, the phrase “has contributed or is contributing” requires affirmative action. The vast majority of courts that have considered this issue read RCRA to require affirmative action rather than merely passive conduct....

Id. at 854 (citations omitted). In ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. v. Prime Technology, Inc., 120 F.3d 351 (2d Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit likewise indicated that affirmative action is necessary to meet the “has contributed or is contributing”

While the Court has previously found evidence supporting the inference that Faison played a minimal role in managing the dry cleaner’s operations specifically related to pollution such that Faison’s liability as an operator cannot be determined on summary judgment, the evidence relied on by Scarlett far from shows that Faison acted as a determining factor over either the handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of PCE. The uncontroverted evidence establishes that Faison never handled, stored, treated, transported, or disposed of any PCE. Rather,
Faison only inquired with the dry cleaning business regarding its compliance with reporting requirements. Scarlett has failed in its summary judgment papers to point to significantly probative evidence causally linking any of Faison’s acts to the pollution in this case. Therefore, Faison is entitled to summary judgment on the § 6972(a)(1)(B) claim.

C. State Law Claims

Scarlett also seeks redress for contamination of the Shopping Center site based on trespass and other common law theories, including breach of contract, nuisance, negligence, and negligence per se. Scarlett further seeks damage under state law for indemnity and/or contribution.

1. Statute of Limitations

Georgia’s four-year statute of limitations governs common law claims involving damage to real property. Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1016 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30). This statute of limitations applies to all common law property damage claims, except breach of written contract, for which the statute of limitations is six years. Gropper v. STO Corp., 250 Ga. App. 820, 822-23, 552 S.E.2d 118 (2001). Because the alleged property damage at issue in this case involves environmental contamination, Georgia’s four-year limitations period is subject to the accrual rule, or the Federal Discovery Rule, set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1). Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1376-81 (M.D. Ga. 1998). Thereunder, the four-year period on the common law claims began to run when Scarlett “knew (or reasonably could have known) that the personal injury or property damages ... were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant concerned.” 42 U.S.C. § 9658(b)(4). If, however, the commencement date is later under state law than it is under federal law, the state law standard applies. O’Connor v. Boeing North American, Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1146-47 (9th Cir. 2002).

The Georgia Supreme Court has long recognized continuing tort liability for

Under Georgia law, a cause of action for a tort that is continuing in nature - for example, the frequent runoff of contaminated water across land, or (as in the present case) the underground leakage of hazardous waste onto adjoining property - accrues at the time of continuance.

Id. at 1091 (citing Myska, 246 Ga. at 571). Similarly, in Hoffman v. Atlanta Gas Light, 206 Ga. App. 727, 426 S.E.2d 387 (1992), the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed whether the migration or spreading of contamination constitutes a continuing nuisance and found as follows:

[S]uit may be maintained for damages growing out of a nuisance of the character indicated, where the damages ... were inflicted within four years before the time of filing suit, though the act which originally caused the nuisance was not done within the period of limitation of the action.... The nuisance in this case is the continuing contamination, not the old leaks. The damage was not complete upon the completion of the creation of the leaks, so appellants are not limited to a cause of action filed within the period of limitations following creation of the leaks or the repairing of the leaks. The damages growing out of the nuisance are the continuing hurt, inconvenience, or damage caused by the hydrocarbon contamination, for which O.C.G.A. § 41-1-1 gives a cause of action, and which were not assuaged by Plantation's sale of the pipeline to another.

206 Ga. App. at 730 (internal citations and marks omitted). The Hoffman court went on to hold that a defendant was "not insulated from responsibility for the maintenance of a continuing nuisance merely by the fact that it did not create the contamination and had no 'causal' relation to the contamination as it was first created," because the maintenance of a nuisance is continuance of the nuisance. Id. at 731.

Under the continuing tort doctrine in Georgia, Scarlett's claims accrue with each new instance of the migration of the contamination. Accordingly, the state statute of limitations is not earlier than the federal commencement date, and the
Federal Discovery Rule does not apply to Scarlett’s state law tort claims. See O’Connor, 311 F.3d 1146-47. Thus, Scarlett’s claims for nuisance and trespass are not barred by the statute of limitations, as Scarlett has presented evidence of a continuing tort.

Scarlett’s claims for breach of contract, negligence, and negligence per se are time barred. With respect to these claims, the statute of limitations began to run when Scarlett notified the GEPD of the FCE in 1994, pursuant to the accrual rule in 42 U.S.C. § 9658(a)(1). Consequently, the four-year statute of limitations for Scarlett’s negligence and negligence per se claims ran in 1998. Further, the six-year statute of limitations for Scarlett’s breach of contract claim ran, at the latest, in 2003, six years after the contract between Faison and Scarlett expired. Therefore, when Scarlett filed this action on January 19, 2005, the statute of limitations on its common law claims for negligence, negligence per se, and breach of contract had expired, and Faison is entitled to summary judgment on these counts.

2. **Nuisance and Trespass Claims**

Faison argues that it is entitled to summary judgment on Scarlett’s nuisance and trespass claims because Scarlett cannot establish or even point to a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Faison is liable for nuisance or trespass. The essential element of nuisance is control over the cause of the harm. See, e.g., Fielder v. Rice Constr. Co., 239 Ga. App. 362, 366, 522 S.E.2d 13 (1999). “The tortfeasor must be either the cause or a concurrent cause of the creation, continuance, or maintenance of the nuisance.” Id. (citations omitted). “While ownership of property generally may give rise to a nuisance when property is used to cause harm to others, such ownership is not an essential element of the cause of action for nuisance.” Id. at 365. “Rather, the exercise of dominion or control over the property causing the harm is sufficient to establish nuisance liability.” City of Columbus v. Barngrover, 250 Ga. App. 589, 592, 552 S.E.2d 536 (2001). A property owner may maintain an action sounding in both nuisance and trespass for the contamination of his property by a

In the instant case, questions of fact remain regarding Faison’s oversight and management of the operations of the dry cleaning business specifically related to pollution. Further, questions of fact remain regarding Faison’s liability for maintaining the nuisance. Based on the evidence of record, a reasonable jury might find Faison liable for nuisance and/or trespass. Accordingly, these claims are not appropriate for resolution at the summary judgment stage.

3. *Scarlett’s Standing to Maintain the Nuisance and Trespass Claims*

Faison finally asserts that Scarlett lacks standing to maintain the nuisance and trespass claims because Scarlett does not own or occupy the Property. The Court disagrees. Georgia law requires that actionable nuisance and trespass claims require that the plaintiff own or occupy the subject property. E.g., *Parker*, 386 F.3d at 1017 (quoting *Briggs*, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1377). In this case, the Court finds that, under state law, Scarlett is the de facto owner of the Property by virtue of its interest in the property through an estate for years.

Scarlett holds an estate for years in the Property by virtue of its long-term master leasehold interest in the Property. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-6-100, 44-6-101, 44-6-102; e.g., *Jekyll Dev. Assocs., L.P. v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors*, 240 Ga. App. 273 (1999). An estate for years carries with it the right to use property in as absolute manner as may be done with a greater estate. O.C.G.A. § 44-6-103; *Jekyll Dev. Assocs.*, 240 Ga. App. at 274. An estate for years passes as realty and may be bought and sold as any other estate, subject to the terms and conditions of the lease. O.C.G.A. §§ 44-6-100, 44-6-102, 44-7-1; e.g., *Paces Partnership v. Grant*, 212 Ga. App. 621 (1994). “[I]t is the policy of the law to treat the tenant of any estate for years as the owner, during the life of such estate.” *Evans Theatre Corp. v. De Give Inv. Co.*, 79 Ga. App. 62, 66, 52 S.E.2d 655 (1949). Accordingly, under its lease with the Tuggles and pursuant to Georgia law, Scarlett is the de facto owner of the Property.
As such, assuming Scarlett is successful at establishing liability, Scarlett is entitled to damages on its claims for nuisance and trespass as the *de facto* owner.

IV. **TUGGLES' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT**

Third Party-Defendants Roy S. Tuggle and Virginia E. Tuggle move for summary judgment on the contribution claims that Faison has asserted against them under various statutes. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that the Tuggles' Motion for Summary Judgment is due to be granted in part and denied in part.

A. **Contribution Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 and O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96**

The Tuggles first move for summary judgment on the contribution claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 9607 ("CERCLA § 107") and § 12-8-96 of HSRA. Faison clarifies in its response, however, that it does not assert a contribution claim under CERCLA § 107 and that it likely is no longer in a position to maintain a contribution claim against the Tuggles under O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96. To the extent that Faison's pleadings could be construed to assert a contribution claim under CERCLA § 107 and because Faison does not appear to oppose the entry of summary judgment on the contribution claim under O.C.G.A. § 12-8-96, the Court grants the Tuggles summary judgment on these claims.

B. **Contribution Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) and O.C.G.A. § 23-2-71**

The Tuggles next contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on Faison’s contribution claims under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) ("CERCLA § 113(f)") and O.C.G.A. § 23-2-71 because the undisputed facts demonstrate that the Tuggles' proportionate share of liability can only be zero. Faison opposes the entry of summary judgment on these particular contribution claims.

Section 107(a) of CERCLA imposes liability upon four types of PRPs, including “the owner ... of a vessel or a facility.” United States v. Atlantic Research, 551 U.S. 128, 135 n. 2, 238 S. Ct. 2331, 168 L. Ed. 2d 28 (2007). Under CERCLA § 113(f), “[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable” under the liability provisions of CERCLA § 107(a). 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f); see also Concrete Sales and Servs., Inc. v. Blue Bird Body Co., 211 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Section 113(f) authorizes any person to seek contribution from any other person who is or may be liable under § 107(a) of CERCLA”). A PRP’s right to contribution “is contingent upon an inequitable distribution of common liability among liable parties.” Atlantic Research, 551 U.S. at 139. “[T]he court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).

Faison also seeks contribution under O.C.G.A. § 23-2-71, which provides: “In cases of joint, joint and several, or several liability of two or more persons, where all are equally bound to bear the common burden and one has paid more than his share, he shall be entitled to contribution from the others ...” CERCLA liability is “joint and several.” Mathis v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 786 F. Supp. 971, 976 (N.D. Ga. 1991).

The Tuggles do not dispute that they are the owners of the Property. Nor do the Tuggles dispute the fact that releases occurred during their period ownership. The Tuggles nonetheless urge dismissal of the contribution claims on the ground that their equitable share of liability for the contamination is zero because Scarlett is the de facto owner of the Property. Alternatively, the Tuggles seek dismissal on the ground that they have been contractually indemnified by Scarlett.

As the admitted owners of the Property both now and when the disposals occurred, there is no question that the Tuggles are strictly liable for the contamination. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Atlantic Research, 551 U.S. at 136 (quoting United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 184 (2d Cir. 2003)); Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1366 (M.D. Ga. 1998) (citing United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989) and United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 168 (4th Cir. 1988)). The Court is aware of no case offering liability protection to “absentee” owners, like the Tuggles, even
when the “absentee” owners had no direct involvement in causing contamination. To the contrary, CERCLA does not sanction “willful or negligent blindness on the part of absentee owners.” Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 169; see also Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago v. North American Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 2007) (“an absentee landowner may be liable under § 107(a) for the full cost ofremedying a hazardous site....”).

Further, although CERCLA permits private parties to contractually allocate their liability to each other, the statute provides that a contractual indemnity shall not relieve an owner of contaminated property of its CERCLA liability to third parties. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(1) (“no indemnification, ... shall be effective to transfer from the owner ... to any other person the liability imposed under this section.”). As Judge Posner wrote for the Seventh Circuit, “We agree with every other appellate court that has been called on to interpret [CERCLA §9607(e)] that it does not outlaw indemnification agreements, but merely precludes efforts to divest a responsible party of his liability.” Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Ministar, Inc., 41 F.3d 341, 342-43 (7th Cir. 1994).

Based on the foregoing authorities, if Faison ultimately is found liable for violations of CERCLA and HSRA, Faison would be entitled to contribution from the Tuggles, notwithstanding the fact that Faison can also seek an equitable contribution from Scarlett. In allocating response costs among liable parties, the Court will take into consideration that Scarlett is the de facto owner of the Property, that the Tuggles have not actively contributed in any way to the contamination, and that Scarlett has indemnified the Tuggles. However, even these factors do not reduce the Tuggles’ proportionate share of liability to zero, as they are still the admitted legal owners of the Property, have been the legal owners of the Property throughout the entire period of contamination, and have received monthly lease payments on the Property for decades, which were generated by operations known for causing environmental harm. Accordingly, the Court denies the Tuggles summary judgment with respect
to the contribution claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) and O.C.G.A. § 23-2-71, and the Court will allocate response costs, as necessary, following a determination of Faison’s liability under CERCLA and HSRA.

C. Contribution Claim Under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32

The Tuggles finally seek summary judgment on Faison’s contribution claim under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32. This statute provides for “contribution among several trespassers just as if the action had been brought against them jointly” and “[i]f judgment is entered jointly against several trespassers and is paid off by one of them, the others shall be liable to him for contribution.” O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32(a), (b). In this case, the Tuggles are not trespassers; rather, the Tuggles are fee simple owners of the Property. It is well-settled that “no man can trespass upon his own property.” Gilreath v. State, 96 Ga. 303, 22 S.E. 907 (1895). Because Faison’s claim for contribution under O.C.G.A. § 51-12-32 fails on its face, the Tuggles are entitled to summary judgment on this claim as well.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part Defendant Faison & Associate, LLC’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 151], DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint [Doc. No. 160], GRANTS in part, DENIES in part, and DENIES AS MOOT in part Third-Party Defendants’ Combined Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 161], and DENIES Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 164].

SO ORDERED this 30th day of September, 2009.

s/ CLARENCE COOPER

CLARENCE COOPER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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